Magnolia St. Line of Duty Deaths

First-person perspective after the maydays from FGT founder

This is the interdepartmental communication Barrett Dorner submitted after the line-of-duty-deaths of Jamie Dickman and Stephen Machchinski. This is being shared with the sole intent of providing perspective on the thoughts and experiences a firefighter goes through while on the scene of this kind of incident. Names have been abbreviated.

I submit this report to the best of my recollection of the incident of Sunday, January 26, 2014. I wish to reserve the right to add to or amend my statement as necessary due to the nature of the incident.

Squad 7
Officer: EZ
Driver: MH
Back: Barrett Dorner

Upon leaving a carbon monoxide call that required us to assist Engine 16 with our meter, we heard a regular alarm go out. It was a reported fire in an occupied apartment building on Magnolia Street. Expecting us to jump the run, I began getting dressed in the rig to the best of my ability while remaining safety-belted into my seat. I recall that the AOR button didn’t seem to take on my officer’s first try and, by the time it took after being hit the second time, dispatch had an EMS call for us. We were sent to an apartment building at the corner of Woodland and Division on an injured person.

At that run, I turned my portable to Channel 4 to monitor the fireground communication; my officer kept his radio on Channel 2 for our EMS assignment. Upon completion of our EMS run, I recall walking down the sidewalk leading away from the the building and hearing Incident Command assign Engine 6 as attack. After already hearing Engine 3 assigned attack, this struck me as odd. As that thought crossed my mind, my driver said aloud what I was thinking: “It doesn't sound like that’s really going well.”

We got back in the rig and were returning to quarters when I heard Chief Haack arrive on scene. Almost immediately, I recall hearing him say there was a change of conditions on the Charlie Side of the structure and that IC should pull out interior crews. We were stopped at the red light at Washington and 17th Sts.; I still had my portable on Channel 4, with the rig’s radio on Channel 1. Within seconds, I heard “mayday, mayday,” quickly spoken with a sense of urgency in the tone of voice. The words were muffled. I said, “I think that was a mayday,” and my driver looked back to me. I was convinced I had heard a mayday, but, as we all discussed it for several seconds, I didn’t want to believe what I had heard. When the dispatcher sounded the emergency tones, it affirmed my thought.

This entire time, I could see the column of black, fast-rising smoke in the distance. At that point, my officer instructed our driver to respond to the scene, but we would use our lights the entire way and siren just at intersections. At this point, Engine 7 informed dispatch they would be responding on the run; within two blocks of our initial position, we had also told dispatch we were responding to the fire. En route, we learned via radio traffic that two firefighters were missing on Division 2. I recall hearing IC ask Engine 3’s officer if he had the missing firefighters on Side Charlie with him, to which the officer replied they were not.

As we arrived, I asked my officer if he wanted me to load our RIT equipment into the Stokes basket and bring it with us to the command post. He told me to hold off until command gave us an assignment.

As I walked up, I approached with my officer from the sidewalk on the north side of Magnolia Street, turning left to the sidewalk on the west side of Huron Street. I immediately noted a large volume of black, turbulent smoke coming from the Alpha Side, Division 2 window of the fire building. I recall thinking the smoke was presenting in a way that, in my mind, indicated the conditions in that room had become incompatible with life. I immediately hoped the two missing firefighters had fallen through the floor to Division 1, as I only saw light in volume, gray smoke coming from the open garage door on the Alpha Side, Sector 1.

As I approached the scene with my officer, another lieutenant — whom I cannot identify with certainty, but recognized in terms of rank based on his helmet shield — told me to pull the jump line off Engine 3, which was parked on the Alpha Side, to knock down fire in the garage. I recall looking into the garage and, approximately 15 feet into the structure, seeing flames from floor to ceiling, but having visibility through what I thought was the entire structure. I recall thinking that I could see light coming in from behind the flames. I pulled the jump line, walked up to the garage door, and was told to mask up. BH of Engine Company 13 was already masked up, took the nozzle and told me “it’ll be inside waiting for you when you’re ready.” I masked up and went in to be his backup man, leaving my personal New York hook tool outside.

My officer joined us and asked me if I had my tool. I told him it was right outside and I would go grab it. I returned and, as we advanced toward that area of the initial visible fire, BH’s end of service time indicator began ringing. BH walked out of the structure since we still had visual contact with exterior crews and I moved to the nozzle. I continued knocking down flames as my officer removed a solid door which I believed was attached to some sort of chain-link divider — I was under the impression this single ‘wall’ was similar to a wall one would find on the perimeter ‘caged’ area in the Fire Shop.

We had followed a path to get to this area, primarily walking along the right-side wall (Delta Side — Sector 4 of this section of the structure). I recall noting two doorway-like areas to my right, set back about 2 feet into the brick wall and wider than a regular doorway. I did not locate an operable door or a stairwell, though I checked for both. I recall thinking that these were older, out-of-use doorways to the old breezeway-like part of the structure attached to the Delta Side that were not going to be available for us.

As we continued to advance, we were joined by our driver. I recall asking my officer repeatedly what our ceiling conditions looked like — concerned about the building’s condition and any collapse potential — to which I do not recall getting an answer, but took the lack of an answer to mean that the conditions were of no concern. I recall around this time hearing the names of the missing firefighters announced over the air by IC and, upon hearing Private Dickman’s name, thought out-loud, “he’s in my class” as we continued our attack.

We continued to advance through the doorway, at which point we walked into a field of debris several feet deep in places from an apparent structural collapse on the Charlie Side of the structure. Above us, there was still approximately 10 feet of overhang extending from the structure, sagging over us for the last four feet or so. It appeared to me to be relatively stable. I recall a wall to our left with very little drywall intact, to the point that I had no place to anchor my hook while I operated the nozzle.

Our driver began asking me if I saw the flames off to our left and right. Due to being surrounded by white smoke, I was under the impression my mask had fogged up. I attempted to clear my mask with my gloved hand, then used my bypass, but conditions did not change. I also had a black mark over my left eye area on my mask, which also led me to believe there was a problem with my visibility through my mask. I knocked down the flames I could see, but handed the nozzle to our driver when she saw something that I could not. I later learned after our NIOSH interviews that my mask was not the issue and that we were all seeing the same conditions.

As I was operating the hose line, I was also searching with my team for any sign of the missing firefighters. I could see mostly-collapsed exterior walls — primarily corners — to the Bravo Side, Delta Side, and a few feet of remaining wall to the Charlie Side. I recall watching the smoke clear and being able to see the sky above us.

At one point, fire was below us in the debris and our driver asked me to spray down the area. I knocked down what I could — trying to limit my water use, recalling NIOSH reports I’ve read where firefighters have drown after being trapped in collapses — and handed our driver the nozzle for what I could not see.

As I recall, we were only able to move about 10 feet past the door — just a few feet from under the ‘overhang’ for the most part — due to the difficulty of moving on the pile of debris. At this point, I heard voices that I thought were coming from behind us (toward the Alpha Side) that they had found one of the firefighters. I asked if we should drop everything to help them remove the firefighter, assuming that — being on Division 1 — he was trapped under debris. Within a second or two, it was clear the voices were above us on Division 2 and we continued with our assignment.

We listened to the radio traffic as the first firefighter was removed from the building. Moments later, I recall hearing a PASS alarm and announced this to my crew. We listened, and the alarm had stopped. I later learned this PASS alarm was sounding outside the structure, possibly from one of the firefighters who assisted in transporting the first downed firefighter and doffed his/her gear in a hurry.

We continued to knock down flames and search the areas we could access and — within what seemed like minutes — heard crews upstairs say that they had found the second firefighter. After hearing that the firefighter was being removed, our EOSTIs were ringing and we made our way to the Alpha Side of the structure, coming out the same way we came in. I recall looking toward the intersection of Huron and Magnolia Streets and seeing gray and black turnout gear, still apparently steaming, on the stretcher as second victim was rushed toward the awaiting Mobile Care ambulance. I recall our driver turning to our officer and saying, “Did you see him? He was burned.” At this point, someone shouted that they needed a paramedic. Our driver sprinted toward the ambulance, doffing her gear as she ran, and jumped into the back of the rig. Lieutenant of Engine 7 gathered at least her coat and SCBA and handed them to me. I told my officer I was going to run the equipment back to Squad 7, and he approved my request.

I placed the equipment in Squad 7 as the Mobile Care unit began transport. At this point, I recall hearing on the radio that a driver was needed for a Rescue Transport for another firefighter. I heard an unidentified unit advise that Squad 7’s paramedic had assisted with transport, leaving another firefighter who would be available. As I walked back up the scene, I came into contact with Acting Deputy Chief RS on Magnolia Street. I told him that I was the other half of the Squad 7 crew and received the message; I just needed him to tell my officer where I was and where I was going. He said he would take care of it. I doffed my coat and SCBA onto the snow on the north side of Magnolia Street. Private ML was walking toward me and I asked him to gather my gear, if he could. I then realized he was going to be riding in the back of the rig with Lieutenant GS and Lieutenant LH. I got into the driver’s seat of Rescue 19 and waited for their okay to go. At one point, my officer knocked on the window of the rig to presumably inform me face-to- face that he knew my new assignment. I used the MDT to put the unit transporting to Mercy St. Vincent Medical Center and proceeded to transport Code 3.

Upon arrival at the hospital, I walked into the ER with the three firefighters who were in the back of the rig. This was the end of my interaction with the incident, as we were left out-of-service at the MSVMC ER for the next several hours.